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11 Introduction
Contrary to Arrow’s negative result (1963) for ﬁnite societies, Fishburn (1970),
Kirman and Sondermann (1972), Armstrong (1980; 1985), and Lauwers and
Van Liedekerke (1995) show that when the number of individuals in a soci-
ety is inﬁnite, there exists a social welfare function (which assigns a social
preference to each proﬁle of individual preferences) satisfying Arrow’s con-
ditions of Unanimity, Independence, and Nondictatorship. Their proofs of
the existence, however, is nonconstructive, failing to give a concrete example
of such a function.1
In the context of social choice, where social welfare functions are of-
ten understood to be a “process or rule” (Arrow, 1963, p. 23), or “proce-
dure” (Arrow, 1963, p. 2), just giving nonconstructive proofs seems unsat-
isfactory. To my knowledge, however, a constructive proof of the possibility
theorem has not been given. This is not surprising for two reasons.
The ﬁrst reason is mathematical: the existence of a social welfare func-
tion satisfying Arrow’s conditions implies (Kirman and Sondermann, 1972,
Theorem 1) the existence of a free ultraﬁlter on the set of individuals; how-
ever, as stated in footnote 1, an ultraﬁlter is a highly nonconstructive math-
ematical object. This fact gives an impression that the desired social welfare
function cannot be constructed without using the axiom of choice or a simi-
lar nonconstructive mathematical technique. (Pazner and Wesley (1978) ob-
serve a similar point in a paper dealing with social choice functions—which
assigns an alternative to each proﬁle—instead of social welfare functions.)
The second reason is interpretive: any social welfare function satisfying
Arrow’s conditions has (Kirman and Sondermann, 1972; Armstrong, 1980;
Lauwers and Van Liedekerke, 1995) certain oligarchical characteristics. This
means that arbitrarily “small” (though inﬁnite) coalitions can dictate the
social preference—in the sense that whenever all individuals in the coalition
prefer a certain alternative x to another alternative y, the society prefers x
to y. In the words of Kirman and Sondermann (1972), there is an “invisible
dictator.” One could thus argue that constructing a particular social welfare
function satisfying Arrow’s conditions would not do much good since the
function constructed would have the undesirable property anyway.
I do not regard either of the above reasons as compelling. As for the
1 The proofs explicitly or implicitly resort to the existence of a free ultraﬁlter over an
arbitrary inﬁnite set. But it is known (Koppelberg, 1989, p. 33) that the existence cannot
be derived from the axiom system ZF of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without the axiom
of choice.
2ﬁrst reason, I may be able to avoid the mathematical problem by modifying
the framework slightly—and indeed I do. As for the second reason, while I
agree with the assertion (Lauwers and Van Liedekerke, 1995, p. 236) that
ultraﬁlters on which the oligarchical functions are based do not provide a
good intuition of “almost all,” I do not think that a good social choice
must always reﬂect the preferences of almost all “individuals”—especially
if the word “individual” does not refer to an ordinary human being. And
in the context of social choice by inﬁnitely many individuals, it is natural
to interpret (Mihara, 1995; Mihara, 1997) an “individual” as a “person at
a particular state of the world.” (The social choice is made before the true
state is known. There are ﬁnitely many persons and inﬁnitely many states;
the same person at diﬀerent states are regarded as diﬀerent individuals.)
Under this particular interpretation, one can regard an oligarchical social
welfare function as simply ignoring the states that are unlikely to be realized.
Along this line of reasoning, I suggest elsewhere (Mihara, 1998) that an
oligarchical function may be regarded as a component or module of a more
appealing superrule. To construct such a superrule, I ﬁrst need to construct
its components.
The main objective of this paper is to construct a concrete example of
a social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s conditions. In other words, I
attempt to “visualize” the “invisible dictator” in this paper. For this pur-
pose, I adopt (Section 2) the framework of my earlier paper (Mihara, 1997),
which exploits Armstrong’s framework (1980; 1985) in a natural way. In
particular, I restrict the domain of a social welfare function to those proﬁles
that are measurable: for all alternatives x and y, the coalition that prefers
x to y is recursive. (A coalition is recursive if there exists an algorithm to
decide for each individual whether she is a member of the coalition.) Then
a concrete example of a social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s conditions
can be constructed (as in Mihara (1998)) in this framework. (The fact that
the class REC of recursive coalitions is a countable Boolean algebra con-
taining all ﬁnite coalitions is used.) The domain restriction above is not an
artiﬁcial mathematical assumption introduced simply to obtain a positive
result. In particular, it does not restrict the preferences of any individual
artiﬁcially. Instead, it meaningfully restricts the way diﬀerent individuals
may have diﬀerent preferences. In the above interpretation, the restriction
means that each person can identify the set of states in which she prefers x
to y—a natural epistemological condition.
In this paper, I do more than just give a concrete example of a social
3welfare function satisfying Arrow’s conditions. I also investigate—from the
viewpoint of computability analysis of social choice—how complex such func-
tions are. (This viewpoint is absent from my related paper (Mihara, 1998).
Computability analysis of social choice studies algorithmic properties of so-
cial decision-making. The literature includes Kelly (1988), Lewis (1988),
and Mihara (1997), who study issues in social choice using recursion the-
ory (study of algorithms). More generally, application of recursion theory
to economic theory and game theory includes Lewis (1985), Spear (1989),
Canning (1992), Anderlini and Felli (1994), and Wong (1994). See also
Kalai (1990) and Lipman (1995) for surveys of the literature on information
processing in these areas.)
I start investigating the complexity issues with a review (Section 3) of my
earlier theorem (Mihara, 1997). The impossibility theorem (Proposition 1)
implies that if a social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Indepen-
dence is computable in the following sense, then it must be dictatorial. I
say that a social welfare function is computable (satisﬁes Strong Pairwise
Computability) if there is an algorithm that can decide (for each pair (x,y) of
alternatives) whether the society prefers x to y from a description of a proﬁle
on {x,y}. (The domain restriction, or the measurability condition, ensures
that a proﬁle restricted to {x,y} is describable by a natural number.)
The impossibility theorem suggests relaxing the notion of computability.
One can relax (“relativize”) the notion by allowing an algorithm to use an
“oracle” from a well-known class of successively more complex sets (oracles),
∅, ∅0, ∅00, ..., in recursion theory.2 Then the impossibility theorem can be
paraphrased: there is no social welfare function computable relative to ∅
that satisﬁes all of Arrow’s conditions. It is an open question whether there
is such a function computable relative to ∅0.
I show however the main result (Theorem 2 in Section 4.1) that there is
one computable relative to ∅00; that is, there exists a social welfare function
satisfying Arrow’s conditions as well as the relaxed notion of Strong Pairwise
Computability 2. In this possibility result, the oracle ∅00 that an algorithm
(oracle algorithm) is allowed to use can be replaced by a certain oracle
called Fin, which can tell for each natural number u whether u is an “index”
of a ﬁnite set or not. Strong Pairwise Computability 2 therefore means that
deciding the social preference is not harder than the problem of deciding
2 These are the empty set, its “jump,” the “second jump,” and so forth. The hierarchy
consisting of these sets is closely related to the arithmetical hierarchy, a diﬀerent hierarchy
of sets according to the quantiﬁer complexity in their syntactic deﬁnition (Soare, 1987).
4whether a given number is an index of a ﬁnite set or not.
Since the main objective of the paper is to constructively resolve Arrow’s
impossibility (1963), I prove (Appendix B) the main theorem through con-
structing (Section 4.2) a concrete function satisfying the conditions. Con-
structing the function would make the “invisible dictator” more “visible”
than the existing literature (Fishburn, 1970; Kirman and Sondermann, 1972;
Armstrong, 1980; Armstrong, 1985; Lauwers and Van Liedekerke, 1995) did.
Furthermore, I sketch (Section 4.3) the process of computing the function.
In addition to facilitating an understanding of the proof, the sketch should
make the “invisible dictator” even more “visible.” I conclude the main body
of the paper with a warning that Theorem 2 should not be viewed as a result
about absolute computability of social welfare functions.
2 Framework
The framework is the same as that of Mihara (1997; 1995), which is based
on Armstrong (1980).
Let N = N = {0,1,2,3,...} be a countable set of individuals (voters),
denoted by natural numbers. A countable set of individuals arises naturally
in social choice. For example, a ﬁnite number of people facing countably
many states of the world can be expressed (Mihara, 1997; Mihara, 1995) as
a countable number of (state-speciﬁc) individuals.
I assume that a planner (a human or machine that computes a social
welfare function) can observe only a certain class of coalitions (sets of indi-
viduals). Since I am concerned with algorithmic properties of a social welfare
function, I assume that the observable coalitions consist of the class REC
of recursive (algorithmically decidable) coalitions. According to Church’s
thesis (Soare, 1987), these are the coalitions for which there is an algorithm
that can decide for (the name of) each individual whether she is in the coali-
tion. (See Appendix A for a more precise deﬁnition of recursive sets.) Note
that the class REC of recursive coalitions forms a Boolean algebra; that is,
it includes N and is closed under union, intersection, and complementation.
Let X be a set of alternatives, which has at least three elements. Let P
be the set of (strict) preferences, i.e., asymmetric and negatively transitive
binary relations on X. A proﬁle is a list p = (Â
p
i )i∈N ∈ PN of individual
preferences Â
p
i , i ∈ N. A weak preference º
p





i in the obvious manner), and the indiﬀerence relation ∼
p
i is the
symmetric part of º
p
i . A proﬁle (Â
p
i )i∈N is REC-measurable (or simply,
5measurable) if for all x and y in X, the coalition {i : x Â
p
i y } that prefers
x to y is recursive. Intuitively, these are the proﬁles that the planner can
observe. (Though the measurability condition implies correlation of the
preferences of diﬀerent individuals, under a certain interpretation it simply
means that each person can identify the set of states in which she prefers
an alternative to another. A further justiﬁcation of the condition is in my
dissertation (Mihara, 1995).) Denote by PN
REC the set of all measurable
proﬁles.
An REC-social welfare function is a function Â:PN
REC → P mapping
each measurable proﬁle p = (Â
p
i )i∈N into a social preference Â (p) = Âp.
(Using the notation Â for a function would not cause a confusion since
preferences are expressed in the form Â
p
i or Âp, with proﬁle p always present
as a superscript.) Social relations ºp, ∼p, ≺p, etc., are deﬁned in the
obvious manner.
I list Arrow’s conditions for REC-social welfare functions:
Unanimity For any x, y ∈ X, and p ∈ PN
REC, if {i : x Â
p
i y } = N, then
x Âp y.
Independence For any x, y ∈ X, and p, p0 ∈ PN
REC, if x 6= y and
Â
p
i ∩{x,y}2 = Â
p0
i ∩{x,y}2 for all i ∈ N, then Âp ∩{x,y}2 = Âp0
∩{x,y}2.




i y =⇒ x Âp y.
An REC-social welfare function violating Nondictatorship is called dictato-
rial.
3 Pairwise Computability
According to the main theorem (same as Proposition 1 below) of my earlier
paper (Mihara, 1997), no social welfare function satisﬁes Arrow’s conditions
of Unanimity, Independence, and Nondictatorship if it also satisﬁes a certain
condition of algorithmic computability, called Pairwise Computability. Be-
fore introducing a new notion of relative computability in the next section,
I brieﬂy review Pairwise Computability for comparison.
The notion of Pairwise Computability is based on Turing computabil-
ity. Turing computability is (one of several equivalents of) the generally
accepted formalization of the intuitive notion of algorithmic computability.
Informally, an algorithm is a ﬁnite list of instructions that, given a symbolic
6input, yields after a ﬁnite number of steps a symbolic output. According
to this intuition, a computation by an algorithm is exact, deterministic and
performed in a discrete manner. Also, inputs and outputs are describable
by natural numbers. Turing computability meets all these intuitive require-
ments.
Suppose that Â is an REC-social welfare function satisfying Indepen-
dence. Pairwise Computability is a local requirement deﬁned for such a
function. It is concerned about how to obtain, for each pair (x,y), the social
preference on (x,y) from a description of a measurable proﬁle p ∈ PN
REC
restricted to the set {x,y}. To describe the restriction (Â
p
i ∩{x,y}2)i∈N of
the proﬁle p to the set by a natural number e, I use a triple of character-
istic indices. Here, a characteristic index of a recursive set A is the G¨ odel
number (name) of an algorithm computing the characteristic function of A.
Given a characteristic index of A, one can eﬀectively obtain the algorithm,
which can determine for any natural number u, whether u is in A. Recall
from Appendix A that e = he1,e2,e3i is the coding (by integer) of a triple
(e1,e2,e3) of integers.
Deﬁnition 1 A natural number e = he1,e2,e3i represents a proﬁle p =
(Â
p
i )i∈N ∈ PN
REC at a pair (x,y) ∈ X ×X if e1, e2, and e3 are characteristic
indices for {i : x Â
p
i y }, {i : y Â
p
i x}, and {i : x ∼
p
i y } respectively.
Note that each natural number represents at most one restricted proﬁle.
The following two deﬁnitions of computability require that the process
of determining whether x Âp y or not (i.e., ¬x Âp y), be an algorithmic
process; they both use as input a representation e of the restricted proﬁle.
Pairwise Computability allows diﬀerent algorithms to be used for diﬀerent
pairs (x,y). Strong Pairwise Computability, a stronger condition introduced
for comparison, requires a single algorithm to work for all pairs.
Pairwise Computability For each pair (x,y) ∈ X2, there exists a partial
recursive function γ such that
(∗) for each proﬁle p ∈ PN
REC and for each natural number e, if e
represents p at (x,y), then
x Âp y =⇒ γ(e) = 1, and
¬x Âp y =⇒ γ(e) = 0.
Strong Pairwise Computability There exists a partial recursive func-
tion γ such that for each pair (x,y) ∈ X2, condition (∗) in Pairwise
Computability is satisﬁed.
7Proposition 1 (Mihara (1997, Theorem 1)) Let Â:PN
REC → P be an REC-
social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence. If Â satis-
ﬁes Pairwise Computability, then it is dictatorial.
4 The main result
4.1 Relativized Pairwise Computability
Proposition 1 suggests weakening the notion of Pairwise Computability. Us-
ing a certain “oracle,” I now introduce a new notion of relative computability
for a social welfare function and show (Theorem 2) that there is a social wel-
fare function satisfying the relative computability and Arrow’s conditions.
The following notion (Strong Pairwise Computability 2) of relative com-
putability is similar to Strong Pairwise Computability, except that use of a
certain oracle and an oracle algorithm is allowed instead of an algorithm. To
understand the nature of an oracle algorithm and its computation, suppose
that we are given the oracle for a set A, which can tell for each number u
whether u belongs to A or not. Informally, an oracle algorithm is an ana-
logue of an algorithm except that it is allowed to ask questions of the form
“Does a number v belong to the oracle?” during computation.
In the following deﬁnition, the oracle ∅00 that I use can be replaced by an
oracle called Fin, which is recursively isomorphic (Appendix A.4) to ∅00. To
deﬁne Fin, I introduce a few terms. A recursively enumerable (r.e.) set is
a set of natural numbers whose elements can be listed (generated) by some
algorithm. An r.e. index of an r.e. set A is the G¨ odel number of an algorithm
that computes a partial function whose domain is A. Formally, the oracle
Fin is the set of r.e. indices (descriptions) of ﬁnite sets. In the following
notion of relative computability, therefore, an oracle algorithm may ask
ﬁnitely many times during a computation whether a certain number is an
r.e. index of a ﬁnite set or not. As before, I suppose that Â is an REC-social
welfare function satisfying Independence.
Strong Pairwise Computability 2 (SPC2) There exists a ∅00-partial re-
cursive function γ such that for each pair (x,y) ∈ X2, for each pro-
ﬁle p ∈ PN
REC, and for each natural number e, if e represents p at (x,y),
then
x Âp y =⇒ γ(e) = 1, and
¬x Âp y =⇒ γ(e) = 0.
8(The number “2” in the name of the condition simply indicates that the
second jump ∅00 of the empty set ∅ is used as an oracle.) Note that SPC2
weakens Strong Pairwise Computability by using the oracle. SPC2 and
Pairwise Computability are incomparable.
The following is the main theorem, a positive one. It establishes the
existence of a social welfare function satisfying (i) Arrow’s conditions and
(ii) Strong Pairwise Computability 2. While the existence of a social welfare
function satisfying only Arrow’s conditions can be derived from an earlier
result by Armstrong (1980), his result does not give a concrete example of
such a function. For this reason, it is signiﬁcant that the theorem will be
proved (Appendix B) for a particular function explicitly constructed. The
function is described in Section 4.2. (It is of mathematical interest to know
whether Theorem 2 still holds when the oracle ∅00 is replaced by the less
complex oracle ∅0. The question is left open.)
Theorem 2 There is an REC-social welfare function Â:PN
REC → P satisfy-
ing Unanimity, Independence, Nondictatorship, and Strong Pairwise Com-
putability 2.
4.2 Construction of the social welfare function
I now construct the social welfare function Â of Theorem 2. The proof
will show that it satisﬁes the conditions in the theorem. The function is
presented here in a more straightforward way than in the proof. Presenting
it at this point should give the reader a clearer picture of the function and
a better understanding of the proof.
To deﬁne the function Â, I ﬁrst construct a collection U of recursive
coalitions. Each coalition in the collection is understood to be a “majority”
of the individuals. First, note that there is (Lemma 2) an enumeration
Wr(0), Wr(1), Wr(2), ...of all recursive coalitions. (Here, r is the function in




Us ∪ {Wr(s)} if this family has an inﬁnite intersection,
Us otherwise.
Here, U0 is the empty set; the condition for the ﬁrst case in the deﬁni-
tion of Us+1 means that (
T





Finally, let U =
S∞
s=0 Us.
9Given the collection U of “majorities,” I now deﬁne a map Â on PN
REC
for p = (Â
p
i )i∈N ∈ PN
REC and x, y ∈ X by
x Âp y ⇐⇒ {i : x Â
p
i y } ∈ U. (1)
I will show in the proof that the map Â is a well-deﬁned REC-social welfare
function satisfying Arrow’s conditions. Intuitively, the society prefers an
alternative x to another alternative y exactly if the coalition that prefers x
to y forms a “majority.”
4.3 Oracle computation of the function
To show the role of the oracle Fin in computing the social welfare function
constructed in the lengthy proof, I now sketch how to decide whether the
society prefers an alternative x to another alternative y, from a represen-
tation e of a proﬁle p at (x,y). (Those who are conversant with recursion
theory may ﬁnd this sketch suﬃcient for establishing Strong Pairwise Com-
putability 2.) Recall that the oracle Fin can tell whether a given number is
an r.e. index of an inﬁnite set or not.
In the following, g(0) is a pre-speciﬁed r.e. index of N. First, given the
representation e = he1,e2,e3i, compute (via a characteristic index e1 of the
recursive set {i : x Â
p
i y }) an r.e. index u of {i : x Â
p
i y } (this means
Wu = {i : x Â
p
i y }). Now suppose that we are in step s + 1 and that
g(s) has been computed in the previous step. To compute g(s + 1), we ask
the oracle whether Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s) is inﬁnite. (Wr(s) is the sth recursive set
in the above enumeration. By Lemma 2, r can be computed by an oracle
algorithm using the oracle.) If the answer is Yes, let g(s+1) be an r.e. index
of Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s) (which can be obtained algorithmically). If the answer is
No, let g(s + 1) = g(s).
Since Wu = {i : x Â
p
i y } is recursive and the sequence r(0), r(1), r(2),
... lists all r.e. indices of recursive sets, we have r(s0) = u at some step s0,
so that Wr(s0) = Wu. In step s0 + 1, which is the ﬁnal step, we are going
to determine whether Wr(s0) = {i : x Â
p
i y } is “large from the viewpoint
of” the inﬁnite Wg(s0), which has been obtained. More precisely, we ask the
oracle whether Wr(s0) ∩ Wg(s0) is inﬁnite. If Yes (so that {i : x Â
p
i y } is
“large from that point of view”), we decide that the society prefers x to y.
If No, we decide that the society does not.
This completes the sketch of the decision problem. Note that we used
only e1 of the representation e = he1,e2,e3i. This means that for the decision
problem, the social welfare function Â uses only the information about the
10coalition {i : x Â
p
i y }, ignoring the information about the other coalitions
{i : y Â
p
i x} and {i : x ∼
p
i y } that e gives. Furthermore, after we obtained
an r.e. index u for {i : x Â
p
i y }, the characteristic index e1 was not used any
more. This suggests that to decide whether to socially prefer x to y using
the oracle, the function Â only needs an r.e. index for the coalition {i :
x Â
p
i y }, which index contains less information than a characteristic index
for the coalition. (Mihara (1995, Appendix D) observes that computability
is generally more diﬃcult to attain with r.e. indices for {i : x Â
p
i y } than
with characteristic indices.) I will record the result, which is of independent
interest and gives robustness to Theorem 2, as Proposition 5. The proof of
Theorem 2 will be based on the proposition.
The above sketch of how to compute the social preference on a pair shows
that the problem is computable relative to the oracle Fin. This means that
the problem is not harder than deciding whether a given number is an r.e.
index of a ﬁnite set or not. It does not mean that the problem is computable
in the absolute sense. For this reason, from the viewpoint of computability
analysis of social choice, Theorem 2 is best regarded as a contribution to
the comparative study of the complexities of various rules.
For incorporating bounded perception, economic theory sometimes as-
sumes that while an element of a set cannot always be identiﬁed, the class
to which the element belongs can be. For example, a complete description
of an individual’s characteristic may not be identiﬁable, but the age and
the sex may be. (In our case, on the contrary, a description—r.e. index—is
already identiﬁed but not its characteristics.) It might therefore seem harm-
less to assume that such a seemingly innocent characteristic like ﬁniteness
can eﬀectively be determined. However, the fact is that such an assumption
is far from being innocent. In particular, Rice’s Theorem (Appendix A) tells
us that there is no algorithm to do this classiﬁcation. (This does not neces-
sarily mean that a person or some non-algorithmic machine cannot do the
classiﬁcation. What a person can do is open to philosophical debate. There
seems to be no strong case, however, for supposing that one can always do
it.) Hence Theorem 2 should be viewed not as a result about absolute com-
putability but as a result comparing the complexity of the social decision
problem with the well known mathematical problem.
11A Recursion theory
This appendix reviews the deﬁnitions and results from recursion theory nec-
essary for understanding the rest of the paper. I mostly follow the notations
and terminologies in Soare (1987). My thesis contains an extended ver-
sion (Mihara, 1995, Appendix A) of the appendix. Other references on
recursion theory include Rogers (1987) and Davis and Weyuker (1983).
In this appendix, x, y and z denote nonnegative integers, and N is the
set {0,1,2,...} of natural numbers. For sets A and B, Ac denotes the
complement of A; A − B denotes the set theoretic diﬀerence A ∩ Bc.
A.1 Partial functions
A partial function on Nn, where n ≥ 1 is an integer, is a function (into
natural numbers) whose domain is a subset of Nn. If the domain of a
partial function on Nn is Nn, then it is called total. For partial functions
φ and θ, φ(x) ↓ denotes that φ(x) is deﬁned; φ(x) ↑ denotes that φ(x) is
undeﬁned; φ = θ denotes that for all x, φ(x) ↓ iﬀ θ(x) ↓ and if φ(x) ↓ then
φ(x) = θ(x); domφ denotes the domain of φ.
A.2 Algorithms
Informally, an algorithm (for a partial function φ on N) is a ﬁnite list of
instructions that, given an input x, yields an output y = φ(x) after a ﬁnite
number of steps if φ(x) is deﬁned. (It should not yield an output if φ(x)
is undeﬁned.) The algorithm must specify how to obtain each step in the
computation from the previous steps and from the input. Informally, if a
partial function is computed by an algorithm, it is called partial recursive.
We accept Church’s Thesis, which identiﬁes the informal class of algo-
rithmically computable partial functions with the class of partial functions
computable by a Turing program. Turing programs can be deﬁned precisely,
but for our purpose, it suﬃces to know that we can list all Turing programs
in such a way that for any program we can mechanically ﬁnd its place (the
code number) in the list and conversely. We choose one such algorithmic
listing (or coding or G¨ odel numbering) and ﬁx it.
Suppose we were given an “oracle” for a set A, which can tell for each
number x whether x belongs to A (in which case, we say that x belongs
to the oracle) or not. (Of course, for certain sets, the behavior of such an
“oracle” cannot be characterized by an algorithm. Formally, an oracle is
12just a set.) Informally, an oracle algorithm is an analogue of an algorithm
except that it is allowed to ask questions of the form “Does a number y
belong to the oracle?” during computation. Then, informally, a partial
function is called partial recursive in A (A-partial recursive) if there is an
oracle algorithm that A-computes it, i.e., if there is an oracle algorithm that
computes it with the oracle for A.
A.3 Computability theory
Code (G¨ odel number) all Turing programs. For e ∈ N, let ϕ
(n)
e be the
partial function of n variables computed by the eth Turing program. A
partial function φ of n variable is partial recursive if φ = ϕ
(n)
e for some e. A
partial recursive function is recursive if it is total. Write ϕe for ϕ
(1)
e .
A set A ⊆ N is recursive (A ∈ REC) if the characteristic function of A is
recursive. e is a characteristic index of A if ϕe is the characteristic function
of A.
Let We = domϕe = {x : ϕe(x) ↓}. A set A ⊆ N is recursively enumer-
able (r.e.) if A = We for some e. We is the eth r.e. set. For an r.e. set A,
e ∈ N is said to be an r.e. index of A if A = We. Each r.e. set has countably
many r.e. indices.
Let Fin be {x : Wx is ﬁnite} and let Rec be {x : Wx is recursive}.
The Enumeration Theorem states (Soare, 1987, p. 15) that there is a
partial recursive function ϕ
(2)
z of two variables such that ϕ
(2)
z (e,x) = ϕe(x)
for all e and x.
The Parameter Theorem (s-m-n Theorem) states (Soare, 1987, p. 16)
that for every m, n ≥ 1, there exists a one-to-one recursive function sm
n of




n (x,y1,...,ym)(z1,...,zn) = ϕ(m+n)
x (y1,...,ym,z1,...,zn)
for all z1, ..., zn.
The Graph Theorem states (Soare, 1987, p. 29) that a partial function
is partial recursive iﬀ its graph is r.e.
A set A ⊆ N is called an index set if for all x and y,
[x ∈ A & ϕx = ϕy] =⇒ y ∈ A.
Rice’s Theorem states that if A is an index set such that A 6= ∅ and
A 6= N, then A is not recursive.
13We let hx,yi denote the image of (x,y) under the standard pairing func-
tion (x2 + 2xy + y2 + 3x + y)/2, which is a one-to-one recursive function
from N × N onto N. Let hx,y,zi denote hhx,yi,zi.
We write ϕe,s(x) = y if x < s, y < s, e < s and y is the output of ϕe(x)
in less than s steps of the eth Turing program.
A.4 Relative computability
A partial function φ is partial recursive in a set A ⊆ N (A-partial recursive)
if there is an oracle Turing program that A-computes φ. If φ is A-computed
by the eth oracle Turing program, we write φ = ΦA
e . The domain domΦA
e
is denoted by WA
e . If φ is partial recursive in A and total, it is recursive in
A. A set B is recursive in A if its characteristic function is recursive in A.
A set B is recursively enumerable in A (r.e. in A) if B = WA
e for some e.
The jump of A, denoted by A0, is KA = {x : x ∈ WA
x }. The nth jump
of A is deﬁned by: A(0) = A, A(m+1) = (A(m))0. It can be shown that A0 is
r.e. in A but not recursive in A. In this sense, A0 is more complex than A.
Also, if A is r.e. in B and B is recursive in C, then A is r.e. in C.
We deﬁne the classes Σn and Πn, which will form the arithmetical hier-
archy of sets in N. A set B is in Σ0 (also, Π0) if B is recursive. For n ≥ 1,
B is in Σn if there is a recursive relation R such that
x ∈ B ⇐⇒ (∃y1)(∀y2)(∃y3)···(Qyn)R(x,y1,...,yn),
where Q is ∃ if n is odd, and ∀ if n is even. B is in Πn if Bc ∈ Σn. B is
in ∆n if B ∈ Σn ∩ Πn. B is arithmetical if B ∈
S
n(Σn ∪ Πn).
Post’s Theorem states, among other things, that for every n ≥ 0,
(i) B ∈ Σn+1 iﬀ B is r.e. in ∅(n), and (ii) B ∈ ∆n+1 iﬀ B is recursive in ∅(n).
Thus, ∅(n) ∈ Σn − Πn for all n > 0.
It is known that Fin = {x : Wx is ﬁnite} is recursively isomorphic to
∅00. That is, there is a one-to-one recursive function p from N onto N such
that p(Fin) = ∅00. Hence, Fin is in Σ2 − Π2.
A.5 Lemmas
The following three Lemmas will be used in the proof of Proposition 5.
Lemma 1 There is a recursive function f such that Wf(x,y) = Wx ∩ Wy
(Soare, 1987, II.1.9, p. 30).
14Lemma 2 There is a ∅00-recursive function r on N whose range {r(n) : n ∈
N} is Rec = {x : Wx is recursive}.
Proof. Since Rec ∈ Σ3, it is r.e. in ∅00 by Post’s Theorem. Hence, Rec is
the range of some ∅00-recursive function r on N.
Lemma 3 Let Inf = {e : We is inﬁnite}. The characteristic function χ =
χInf of Inf is ∅00-recursive.
Proof. Since Inf ∈ Π2 (Soare, 1987, IV.3.2, p. 66), Inf ∈ ∆3. Then, by
Post’s Theorem, Inf is recursive in ∅00, which means that the characteristic
function of Inf is ∅00-recursive.
B Proof of the main result
B.1 Decisive coalitions and ultraﬁlters
The proof of Theorem 2 uses Armstrong’s results (1980; 1985) discussed in
this section.
Let B be a Boolean algebra on a set I: it includes I and is closed under
union, intersection, and complementation. A ﬁlter F on B is a family of
sets in B satisfying: (i) ∅ / ∈ F; (ii) if A ∈ F and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ F; (iii) if
A, B ∈ F, then A ∩ B ∈ F. We may think of a ﬁlter as a family of “large”
sets. An ultraﬁlter is a ﬁlter F that satisﬁes: if A / ∈ F, then Ac ∈ F. If
F is an ultraﬁlter, then A ∪ B ∈ F implies that A ∈ F or B ∈ F. For B
containing all ﬁnite sets of I, we say an ultraﬁlter F is ﬁxed if it is of the
form F = {A ∈ B : i ∈ A} for some i ∈ I; otherwise, it is called free and
does not contain any ﬁnite sets. Koppelberg (1989) gives an exposition of
these notions.
I state the following Propositions for REC-social welfare functions, where
REC is the Boolean algebra of recursive coalitions on the set N = {0,1,2,...}
of individuals. The propositions were originally stated for more general so-
cial welfare functions.
Proposition 3 (Armstrong (1980, Proposition 3.2)) Suppose an REC-social
welfare function Â satisﬁes Unanimity and Independence. Then there is a
unique ultraﬁlter UÂ on REC such that for all p = (Â
p
i )i∈N ∈ PN
REC and x,
y ∈ X,
{i : x Â
p
i y } ∈ UÂ =⇒ x Âp y. (2)
15Proposition 4 (Armstrong (1980, Proposition 3.1)) Suppose U is an ul-
traﬁlter on REC. Then the map Â on PN
REC deﬁned for p ∈ PN
REC and x,
y ∈ X by
x Âp y ⇐⇒ {i : x Â
p
i y } ∈ U
is an REC-social welfare function, satisfying Unanimity and Independence.
Furthermore, if U is free, then Â satisﬁes Nondictatorship.
Armstrong calls a free ultraﬁlter on a Boolean algebra of coalitions an
invisible dictator.
B.2 Deciding decisive coalitions from r.e. indices
Proposition 3 implies that the decisive coalitions of a social welfare func-
tion satisfying Unanimity and Independence form an ultraﬁlter. In my the-
sis (Mihara, 1995, Appendix D), I investigated various algorithmic methods
of deciding from an r.e. index of a recursive coalition whether or not the
coalition belongs to the ultraﬁlter. In the thesis, starting with strong condi-
tions of decidability of coalitions belonging to the ultraﬁlter, I successively
relaxed the conditions to get more positive results. I discuss in this section
one of the most positive results there. The result (Proposition 5 below),
which is of independent interest, will be used to prove Theorem 2 in the
next section.
Let Â:PN
REC → P be an REC-social welfare function satisfying Unanim-






1 if We is recursive and We ∈ UÂ,
0 if We is recursive and We / ∈ UÂ,
↑ if We is nonrecursive,
(3)
where We is the eth r.e. set (i.e., the domain of the eth partial recursive
function) and UÂ denotes the ultraﬁlter in Proposition 3. (e is an r.e. index
for the set We.) Clearly, αÂ is well-deﬁned. Note that the domain of αÂ
is Rec = {e : We is recursive}, the index set for the class REC of recursive
sets. Also, αÂ(e) = αÂ(e0) if We = We0. I use the indicator αÂ to deﬁne
the following condition (DDC2) of decidability of decisive coalitions. (The
number “2” in the name of the condition indicates that the second jump ∅00
of ∅ is used as an oracle. There is no “DDC1” introduced. The condition is
called “Computability 5” in my thesis (Mihara, 1995).)
16Decidability of Decisive Coalitions 2 (DDC2) αÂ has an extension to
a ∅00-partial recursive function.
Proposition 5 There is an REC-social welfare function Â:PN
REC → P sat-
isfying Unanimity, Independence, Nondictatorship, and DDC2.
Remark 1 Indeed, we actually show below that αÂ itself is ∅00-partial recur-
sive. Note that αÂ cannot be ∅0-partial recursive. (The domain Rec of αÂ is
known (Soare, 1987, IV.3.6, p. 66) to be Σ3-complete. In particular, Rec is
not in Σ2. This implies that Rec is not r.e. in ∅0; if it were, then Rec would
be in Σ2 by Post’s Theorem. Since its domain Rec is not r.e. in ∅0, α cannot
be ∅0-partial recursive.)
αÂ has no extension α0 such that (i) it is recursive in ∅00, and (ii) α0(e) = 2
if αÂ(e) ↑. For (Rec)c = {e : α0(e) = 2} would be r.e. in ∅00 if such an α0
existed; then (Rec)c would be Σ3, implying Rec ∈ Π3; but Rec / ∈ Π3. ♦
Proof. We will ﬁrst construct a free ultraﬁlter U on the Boolean alge-
bra REC. Proposition 4 will then imply that the REC-social welfare func-
tion Â corresponding to U satisﬁes Unanimity, Independence, and Nondic-
tatorship. We will ﬁnally establish that Â satisﬁes DDC2 by showing that
αÂ is ∅00-partial recursive. To show that, note that the indicator αÂ in
DDC2 is deﬁned by letting UÂ = U in (3), since the unique ultraﬁlter UÂ in
Proposition 3 corresponding to the function Â is obviously U.
Before constructing U, let us note Lemmas 1–3. We let f, r, χ be the
functions f, r, χInf in the Lemmas.
First, we construct sets A, B ⊆ Rec which are r.e. in ∅00 as follows:
Stage s = 0. Let A0 = B0 = ∅. Choose g(0) arbitrarily such that
Wg(0) = N.
Stage s + 1. Suppose at stage s ≥ 0, ﬁnite sets As, Bs ⊆ Rec and
an inﬁnite r.e. set Wg(s) are deﬁned. We construct ﬁnite sets As+1, Bs+1
and an inﬁnite r.e. set Wg(s+1) at Stage s + 1 as follows: (At Stage s +
1, we decide whether to include r(s) in As+1 or Bs+1.) Check if Wr(s) ∩
Wg(s) is inﬁnite. (That is, whether f(r(s),g(s)) ∈ Inf; equivalently, whether
χ[f(r(s),g(s))] = 1.) This is eﬀectively decidable with the oracle ∅00, by
Lemmas 1–3. (See the proof of Lemma 6 for further details.) If the answer
to this test is Yes, let As+1 = As ∪ {r(s)}, Bs+1 = Bs, and g(s + 1) =
f(r(s),g(s)) (so that Wg(s+1) = Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s)). If the answer is No, let
As+1 = As, Bs+1 = Bs ∪ {r(s)}, and g(s + 1) = g(s) (so that Wg(s+1) =
17Wg(s)). We can see that As ⊆ As+1, Bs ⊆ Bs+1, Wg(s) ⊇ Wg(s+1); and r(s)
belongs to either As+1 or Bs+1, but not both. Also, by induction, we can
show the following (assuming
T
e∈∅ We = N):




(ii) Wg(s) is inﬁnite.
Finally, let A =
S
As and B =
S
Bs.
Lemma 5 (i) A ∪ B = Rec;
(ii) A ∩ B = ∅.
Proof. (i) Obvious.
(ii) Suppose e ∈ A ∩ B. Let e0 = e and let s0, s be the least s0, s such
that e0 ∈ As0+1 and e ∈ Bs+1, so that e = e0 is put into As0+1 at Stage s0 + 1
and into Bs+1 at Stage s + 1. Then e0 = r(s0) and e = r(s).
(Case: s0 < s). At Stage s0 + 1, since e0 = r(s0) is put into As0+1,
Wr(s0) ∩ Wg(s0) must be inﬁnite, and so Wg(s0+1) = Wr(s0) ∩ Wg(s0). Hence,
Wr(s0) ⊇ Wg(s0+1). Now at Stage s + 1, we are given an inﬁnite Wg(s) and
check whether Wr(s) ∩Wg(s) is inﬁnite. But since Wg(s0+1) ⊇ Wg(s) (because
s0 + 1 ≤ s), it follows that Wr(s0) ⊇ Wg(s0+1) ⊇ Wg(s). Then,
Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s) ⊇ Wr(s0) ∩ Wg(s) = Wg(s),
which is inﬁnite; hence, Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s) is inﬁnite. So e = r(s) is put into
As+1, not into Bs+1.
(Case: s0 ≥ s). At stage s + 1, since e = r(s) is put into Bs+1, Wr(s) ∩
Wg(s) must be ﬁnite. We have Wg(s) ⊇ Wg(s0) since s ≤ s0. At Stage s0 + 1,
Wr(s0) ∩ Wg(s0) ⊆ Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s0) ⊆ Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s),
which is ﬁnite. So, e0 = r(s0) is not put into As0+1. ♦
Lemma 6 A, B are r.e. in ∅00.
Proof. Let gA, gB be deﬁned as follows:
gA(x,0) ≡ 0 and gB(x,0) ≡ 0;
gA(x,s + 1) =
½
1 if gA(x,s) = 1 or x = r(s) & χ[f(r(s),g(s))] = 1,
0 otherwise;
18gB(x,s + 1) =
½
1 if gB(x,s) = 1 or x = r(s) & χ[f(r(s),g(s))] = 0,
0 otherwise.
Then, by mathematical induction on s, we can easily obtain that
gA(x,s) = 1 ⇐⇒ x ∈ As
and
gB(x,s) = 1 ⇐⇒ x ∈ Bs.
For easy reference, we rewrite the deﬁnition of g:
g(0) is an arbitrary e such that We = N,
g(s + 1) =
½
f(r(s),g(s)) if χ[f(r(s),g(s))] = 1,
g(s) otherwise.
Therefore, g is ∅00-recursive since g is obtained by primitive recursion (Soare,
1987, p. 9) from a function composed from ∅00-recursive functions f, r, and
χ. It is then easy to see gA and gB are ∅00-recursive, since each of them is
obtained by primitive recursion from ∅00-recursive functions.
Now we have
x ∈ A ⇐⇒ x ∈ As for some s
⇐⇒ ∃s [gA(x,s) = 1],
which shows A is r.e. in ∅00, since gA(x,s) = 1 is a ∅00-recursive relation.
Similarly for B. ♦
Now, let U = {W : W = We for some e ∈ A}.
Lemma 7 (i) e ∈ Rec & We ∈ U ⇐⇒ e ∈ A;
(ii) e ∈ Rec & We / ∈ U ⇐⇒ e ∈ B.
Proof. (i) (⇐=). Trivial.
(=⇒). Suppose e ∈ Rec and We ∈ U, but e / ∈ A. Then, by Lemma 5,
e ∈ B; also, We = We0 for some e0 ∈ A. Since e, e0 ∈ Rec, e = r(s), e0 = r(s0)
for some s, s0 ∈ N. Let s, s0 be the least such s, s0. Then e = r(s) is put into
Bs+1 at Stage s + 1 and e0 = r(s0) is put into As0+1 at Stage s0 + 1. Follow
the cases (Case: s0 < s) and (Case: s0 ≥ s) in the proof of Lemma 5(ii).
(ii) (=⇒). Suppose e ∈ Rec and We / ∈ U. If e ∈ A, then We ∈ U, by (i).
So, e / ∈ A. Then e ∈ B by Lemma 5.
(⇐=). Let e ∈ B. Then e ∈ Rec by Lemma 5. If We ∈ U, then e ∈ A by
(i). So, We / ∈ U. ♦
19Lemma 8 U is a free ultraﬁlter.
Proof. (i) (U is a ﬁlter.) (a) To show ∅ / ∈ U, observe that if Wr(s) = ∅,
then Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s) is ﬁnite (being empty). So, r(s) / ∈ A.
(b) Suppose We0, We are recursive, We0 ∈ U and We ⊇ We0. To show
e ∈ A (hence We ∈ U), suppose e ∈ B for contradiction. Let s, s0 be the
least s, s0 such that e = r(s) and e0 = r(s0). Then e = r(s) is put into Bs+1
at Stage s + 1 and e0 = r(s0) is put into As0+1 at Stage s0 + 1. Follow the
cases (Case: s0 < s) and (Case: s0 ≥ s) in the proof of Lemma 5(ii).
(c) Suppose recursive sets We, We0 are in U. We show that We∩We0 ∈ U.
Since e, e0 ∈ A by Lemma 7(i), e, e0 ∈ As for some s. Choose ¯ s such that
Wr(¯ s) = We∩We0 and ¯ s > s. This is possible since W = We∩We0 is recursive





But since s < ¯ s, Wg(s) ⊇ Wg(¯ s). So,
Wr(¯ s) = We ∩ We0 ⊇ Wg(s) ⊇ Wg(¯ s).
At Stage ¯ s + 1, given an inﬁnite Wg(¯ s), we check whether Wr(¯ s) ∩ Wg(¯ s) is
inﬁnite. But it is inﬁnite since it equals Wg(¯ s) because Wr(¯ s) ⊇ Wg(¯ s). Hence
r(¯ s) ∈ A¯ s+1, so Wr(¯ s) ∈ U. That is, We ∩ We0 ∈ U.
(ii) (The ﬁlter U is an ultraﬁlter.) Suppose We, We0 are recursive, they
are complements of each other, and We, We0 / ∈ U. Choose s, s0 such that
s < s0 (by symmetry, we can do so without loss of generality) and e = r(s),
e0 = r(s0). Since e, e0 / ∈ A, both Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s) and Wr(s0) ∩ Wg(s0) are ﬁnite.
Since s < s0, Wg(s) ⊇ Wg(s0). Now Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s0) ⊆ Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s) is ﬁnite,
since the right hand side is ﬁnite. We then have
Wg(s0) = N ∩ Wg(s0)
= (Wr(s) ∪ Wr(s0)) ∩ Wg(s0)
= (Wr(s) ∩ Wg(s0)) ∪ (Wr(s0) ∩ Wg(s0)),
which is ﬁnite, contradiction to Lemma 4(ii).
(iii) (U is free.) Suppose We ∈ U Then by Lemma 7(i), e ∈ As for some
s. So, We ⊇
T
e∈As We = Wg(s). But Wg(s) is inﬁnite by Lemma 4(ii). This
shows any element of U must be inﬁnite. So, U cannot be principal. ♦
Therefore, the social welfare function Â corresponding to U (Proposition 4)
satisﬁes Nondictatorship as well as Unanimity and Independence.
20We have, by (3) and Lemma 7,
αÂ(e) = y ⇐⇒ (y = 1 & e ∈ Rec & We ∈ U) ∨ (y = 0 & e ∈ Rec & We / ∈ U)
⇐⇒ (y = 1 & e ∈ A) ∨ (y = 0 & e ∈ B).
This shows graphαÂ is r.e. in ∅00 since A, B are r.e. in ∅00 by Lemma 6. It
follows that αÂ is ∅00-partial recursive by the Graph Theorem.
B.3 The proof
This section gives the proof of Theorem 2.
Let Â be the REC-social welfare function constructed in the proof of
Proposition 5; the function is the same as that constructed in Section 4.2.
It satisﬁes Unanimity, Independence, Nondictatorship, and DDC2. Let α =
αÂ, U = UÂ. (αÂ is deﬁned by (3) in Appendix B.2 and UÂ is given in
Proposition 3.) Note that α is ∅00-partial recursive. Let CRec be deﬁned by
x ∈ CRec iﬀ x is a characteristic index of a recursive set.




1 if ϕe(u) = 1,
↑ otherwise.
Proof. The partial function ψ deﬁned by
ψ(e,u) =
½
1 if ϕe(u) = 1,
↑ otherwise
is partial recursive by the Enumeration Theorem. Hence ψ = ϕ
(2)
z for some z.
By the Parameter Theorem, there is a one-to-one recursive function s such
that
ϕs(z,e)(u) = ϕ(2)
z (e,u) = ψ(e,u).
Let f(e) = s(z,e). Then f is recursive. ♦
Lemma 9 Let e ∈ CRec. Then f(e) ∈ Rec and e is a characteristic index
for Wf(e).
Proof. Trivial. ♦
Lemma 9 means that if e1 is a characteristic index for a recursive set A,






1 if e ∈ CRec & α(f(e)) = 1,
0 if e ∈ CRec & α(f(e)) = 0,
2 otherwise.
(For the purpose of proving the theorem, totality of β is not essential; we
could do as well by replacing the 2 in the third case by ↑.)
Lemma 10 β is ∅00-recursive.
Proof. Since
e ∈ CRec ⇐⇒ (∀x)(∃s)[ϕe,s(x) = 1 ∨ ϕe,s(x) = 0],
it follows that CRec ∈ Π2 ⊆ ∆3. So, CRec is recursive in ∅00. β can
therefore be ∅00-computed by giving the value 2 when e / ∈ Crec and the value
of α(f(e)) (which converges to 1 or 0 by Lemma 9 and the deﬁnition of α)
when e ∈ Crec. ♦





1 if f(e) ∈ Rec and Wf(e) ∈ U,
0 if f(e) ∈ Rec and Wf(e) / ∈ U,
↑ otherwise.





1 if e is a characteristic index of a recursive set in U,
0 if e is a characteristic index of a recursive set not in U,
2 otherwise.
(4)
Deﬁne a function γ by
γ(he1,e2,e3i) = β(e1).
Then, for any natural number e = he1,e2,e3i, γ(e) = β(π(e)), where π:e 7→
e1. Since π is recursive and β is ∅00-recursive, γ is ∅00-recursive.
It suﬃces to show that for all (x,y), γ satisﬁes the condition in SPC2.
Fix (x,y) and suppose e = he1,e2,e3i represents a p at (x,y). Then e1 is a
characteristic index of {i : x Â
p
i y }.
• Suppose x Âp y. Then by the deﬁnition of Â (Proposition 4), {i :
x Â
p
i y } ∈ U, where U is constructed in the proof of Proposition 5.
This implies by (4) that γ(e) = β(e1) = 1.
• Similarly, if ¬x Âp y then γ(e) = 0.
22References
Anderlini, L. and L. Felli, 1994, Incomplete written contracts: Undescribable
states of nature, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 1085–1124.
Armstrong, T. E., 1980, Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition algebras,
Journal of Mathematical Economics 7, 55–75.
Armstrong, T. E., 1985, Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions: Er-
ratum and addendum to ‘Arrow’s Theorem with restricted coalition
algebras’, Journal of Mathematical Economics 14, 57–59.
Arrow, K. J., 1963, Social choice and individual values, 2nd edition (Yale
University Press, New Haven).
Canning, D., 1992, Rationality, computability, and Nash equilibrium,
Econometrica 60, 877–888.
Davis, M. D. and E. J. Weyuker, 1983, Computability, complexity, and
languages: Fundamentals of theoretical computer science (Academic
Press, San Diego).
Fishburn, P. C., 1970, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Concise proof and
inﬁnite voters, Journal of Economic Theory 2, 103–106.
Kalai, E., 1990, Bounded rationality and strategic complexity in repeated
games, in: T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman, and Y. Tauman, eds., Game theory
and applications (Academic Press, San Diego) 131–157.
Kelly, J. S., 1988, Social choice and computational complexity, Journal of
Mathematical Economics 17, 1–8.
Kirman, A. P. and D. Sondermann, 1972, Arrow’s Theorem, many agents,
and invisible dictators, Journal of Economic Theory 5, 267–277.
Koppelberg, S., 1989, Handbook of Boolean algebras, Vol. 1 (North-Holland,
Amsterdam). Edited by J. D. Monk, with the cooperation of R. Bonnet.
Lauwers, L. and L. Van Liedekerke, 1995, Ultraproducts and aggregation,
Journal of Mathematical Economics 24, 217–237.
Lewis, A. A., 1985, On eﬀectively computable realizations of choice func-
tions, Mathematical Social Sciences 10, 43–80.
23Lewis, A. A., 1988, An inﬁnite version of Arrow’s Theorem in the eﬀective
setting, Mathematical Social Sciences 16, 41–48.
Lipman, B. L., 1995, Information processing and bounded rationality: A
survey, Canadian Journal of Economics 28, 42–67.
Mihara, H. R., 1995, Arrow’s Theorem, Turing computability, and oracles,
PhD thesis (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis).
Mihara, H. R., 1997, Arrow’s Theorem and Turing computability, Economic
Theory 10, 257–76.
Mihara, H. R., 1998, Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice
function: A constructive proof, Mimeo. A version available as ewp-
pe/9604002 from the EconWPA.
Pazner, E. A. and E. Wesley, 1978, Cheatproofness properties of the plurality
rule in large societies, Review of Economic Studies 45, 85–91.
Rogers, Jr., H., 1987, Theory of recursive functions and eﬀective computabil-
ity, paperback edition (MIT Press, Cambridge).
Soare, R. I., 1987, Recursively enumerable sets and degrees: A study of
computable functions and computably generated sets (Springer-Verlag,
Berlin).
Spear, S. E., 1989, Learning rational expectations under computability
constraints, Econometrica 57, 889–910.
Wong, K., 1994, Economic equilibrium theory: A computability viewpoint,
PhD thesis (University of Minnesota, Minneapolis).
24